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Abstract 
The IS literature on mobile platform ecosystems has so far discussed platform dynamics 
from a software perspective. But recent regulatory and competitive developments have 
impacted the hardware layer of mobile platform ecosystems: an increasing number of 
third-party repair providers have started to modify physical components outside the 
platform owners’ direct sphere of influence while platform owners attempt to maintain 
control over the ecosystem. We report on our ongoing case research to develop an 
account of what we call hardware-layer dynamics in mobile platform ecosystems. 
Based on an inductive case study of third-party repair complementors operating in 
Apple’s iPhone aftermarket, we explain how these dynamics are shaped through 
interactions between complementors and platform owners over time. We expect our 
contributions to extend our field’s attention to the entire modular architecture of digital 
platforms—and the ecosystem they support. 
Keywords:  Mobile platform, ecosystems, governance, case study, digital technology, hardware 
Introduction 
Mobile digital technologies, such as Apple’s iPhone or Google’s Android phones are at the core of 
important mobile platform ecosystems, i.e., combinations of mobile hardware and software that provides 
standards, interfaces, and rules that enable and allow providers of complements to add value and interact 
with each other and/or users (Teece 2018). Recent regulatory and competitive developments have had an 
important impact on these mobile platform ecosystems: Jurisdictions, such as the US copyright law 
exemption to electronics repairs (U.S. Copyright Office 2018), are pushing platform owners to relax legal 
measures that in the past helped to protect the hardware layer of their platform, i.e., the technical core 
centered around a mobile operating system, its software complements, and involved actors (Basole and 
Karla 2011; Reuver et al. 2018). Simultaneously, a growing number of third-party actors specialized on 
physical hardware modifications have emerged and provide end user repair services outside the platform 
owners’ direct sphere of influence (Riisgaard et al. 2016). Together, these developments bring 
‘hardware’—the material bearers of transport or machinery in the devices that compose the physical 
mobile platform core—into focus. 
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IS research on mobile platform ecosystems has so far been discussing platform dynamics largely from a 
software perspective (Eaton et al. 2015; Ghazawneh and Henfridsson 2013; Qiu et al. 2017; Sørensen et al. 
2015; Ye and Kankanhalli 2018), with some exceptions (Michell and Gupta 1997; Wolf 1994). The 
physical, material components of mobile platform ecosystems have so far been treated almost entirely as 
stable ‘containers’ or ‘vessels.’ Given the developments in current mobile platform ecosystems, this 
unidimensional view carries two assumptions: 
1. Physical hardware-layer components form a stable core of the mobile platform ecosystem and remain 
untouched by third-party actors during the evolution of the ecosystem. 
2. Mobile platform ecosystem success is sustained by complementary software assets developed by third-
party actors, which are governed by software tools and regulations designed by the platform owner. 
Our ongoing research sets out to challenge both assumptions: Through an inductive case study of 
independent consumer electronics spare parts and repair service providers operating in Apple’s iPhone 
mobile platform ecosystem we observe how physical hardware components of the mobile platform devices 
change over time through actions induced by third-party actors. We also observe how proprietary platform 
owners actively engage in governance acts attempting to control the physical hardware layer through 
different instruments and mechanisms designed to “fight off” such third-party actions. 
In writing this research-in-progress paper, we report on our ongoing effort to develop an account of what 
we call hardware-layer dynamics in mobile platform ecosystems by explaining how these dynamics 
are shaped through the interactions between platform owners and third-party complementors over time. 
The research question guiding our work is: How do platform owners and third-party complementors 
shape hardware-layer dynamics in mobile platform ecosystems? 
We consider our expected contributions relevant for three reasons: First, digital platforms have 
technological interdependencies between components on different layers (Yoo et al. 2010) but these 
interdependencies have been largely neglected so far. We develop new conceptual tools to “widen [the] 
scope of digital platform research” (Reuver et al. 2018, p. 129). In doing so, we extend our field’s attention 
from the software layer to the entire modular architecture of digital platforms and the ecosystem 
surrounding them by explicitly bringing the hardware layer of their architecture into focus. 
Second, this extended focus raises new questions about mobile platform ecosystem governance (Eaton et 
al. 2015; Ghazawneh and Henfridsson 2013). The regulatory and competitive developments in the mobile 
platform markets have already begun to expand the range of governance requirements beyond the 
software layer: platform owners must strategically position themselves towards third-party induced 
changes on the hardware layer. Our work offers a first account of the governance acts that mobile 
platform owners perform to protect themselves against third-party hardware changes. Thus, our work 
offers a new conceptual basis for future research on the “strategic interplay between platform owners and 
ecosystem actors over time” (Constantinides et al. 2018, p. 390). 
Third, we take a so-far overlooked complementor perspective and context (McIntyre and Srinivasan 
2017), that of independent hardware repair service providers. Complementors differ from platform 
owners in terms of motivation and abilities, and do not always align with the platform owner’s strategic 
goals and values (Huber et al. 2017). The hardware context is also in so far unique that hardware 
complementors cannot be as strictly controlled as software complementors, for the types and processes of 
value co-creation and capture differ remarkably. How mobile platform owners deal with these unique 
conditions is part of our expected research contribution. 
Background 
Technological advances have fueled an increasing infusion of digital capabilities into products stimulating 
new functionalities, products, and use cases (Yoo et al. 2010), allowing companies to use digital products 
as the core of platform ecosystems. For example, Apple created a well-known ecosystem around its iPhone 
and the App Store. These digital platforms have two important characteristics, (1) their technological 
architecture and (2) the social processes constituting their governance (Saadatmand et al. 2019). 
From the architectural perspective, mobile platforms are enabled by an underlying modular architecture 
dividing the platform into a set of stable components with low variety (i.e., the core) and a set of 
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peripheral components with high variety (i.e., complements), which are connected via standardized 
interfaces (Baldwin and Woodard 2009). This architecture allows third-party actors to provide software 
(e.g., apps) and hardware complements (e.g., batteries) to the platform core, thereby increasing the value 
of the platform for its users (Boudreau 2010). The platform core, its complements, and the actors 
providing and modifying them (i.e., platform owner, third-party software and hardware providers, and 
users) constitute what we define as mobile platform ecosystem (Basole and Karla 2011; Qiu et al. 2017).  
Research on the core and peripheral components of digital platform architectures are skewed in that most 
literature has focused on software elements, neglecting hardware; exceptions can be found in the 
engineering-oriented literature on embedded systems (Michell and Gupta 1997; Wolf 1994) and hardware 
product design (Cabigiosu et al. 2013). While this literature provides relevant knowledge on the modularity 
and layered interrelatedness of technological systems, it does not thoroughly cover the socio-technical and 
dynamic evolution of ecosystems around platforms that couple hardware and software layers. 
The second key characteristic of mobile platform ecosystems concerns the governance, i.e., the question 
“who makes what decisions about a platform” (Tiwana et al. 2010, p. 679). This aspect gained importance 
when platform owners adopted a strategy to attract heterogenous third-party actors to design and 
produce novel complements to the platform’s ecosystem (Boudreau 2012). Opening the platform to third-
party complementors, the platform owner must carefully govern the platform’s ecosystem balancing the 
equilibrium of stability and innovation-driven evolvability (Tiwana et al. 2010; Wareham et al. 2014). 
Like research on the architectural characteristics, governance mechanisms have predominantly been 
discussed within the scope of software platforms, investigating the arm’s length relationship between the 
platform owner and third-party software developers (Reuver et al. 2018). For example, platform owners 
provide technological (e.g., SDKs, APIs) and social resources (e.g., documentations, guidelines)—overall 
conceptualized as boundary resources by Ghazawneh and Henfridsson (2013)—to third-party developers 
enabling and controlling the development of software complements (Eaton et al. 2015). 
Our key departure lies in the observation that platform owners such as Apple also exercise governance on 
the hardware layer of mobile platforms, for instance via the design of technological interfaces between 
hardware and software layer. Yet, the literature has not yet accounted for this type of governance on the 
hardware layer, nor examined how the governance acts on the software and hardware layer might 
interact. Instead, the hardware layer is tacitly assumed to be a ‘stable core’, which—under the centralized 
control of the platform owner—remains untouched by third parties. We report on our ongoing empirical 
study of a case setting where this assumption is being challenged. 
Method 
Design 
We chose a holistic multiple-case design (Yin 2018), focusing on the operations of several third-party 
actors in the hardware repair aftermarket of Apple’s mobile platform ecosystem. We chose case research 
because even though we have a proper understanding of software-layer dynamics of mobile platforms 
(Eaton et al. 2015; Ghazawneh and Henfridsson 2013), hardware-layer dynamics remain novel and 
complex phenomena whose boundaries and contexts are not immediately apparent (Yin 2018). 
Our case study research is primarily inductive. However, while we ground our theorizing in empirical 
evidence collected from primary and secondary data sources (Eisenhardt 1989), our theoretical departure 
is not entirely from scratch. Instead, our research is sensitized by the concepts of mobile platform 
ecosystems, platform dynamics, and platform governance (see ‘Data Analysis’ for more details). 
Case Setting 
Our case study is set in the repair aftermarket of Apple’s iPhone devices, the physical core of the iOS 
mobile platform ecosystem. We selected this setting for three reasons: First, Apple’s mobile platform 
ecosystem is highly governed and uncontrolled dynamics on the hardware layer (i.e., iPhone device) are 
by design not intended (Boudreau 2010). Thus, it provides an extreme case setting to observe third-party 
induced hardware-layer dynamics. Second, we want our theoretical contributions to extend existing 
knowledge on software-layer dynamics (Eaton et al. 2015; Ghazawneh and Henfridsson 2013). Therefore, 
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we chose a case setting that is part of the same mobile platform ecosystem. Third, Apple’s mobile platform 
ecosystem offers a wide and rich range of data sources allowing for insightful in-depth analysis (Eaton et 
al. 2015). 
Since the introduction of the iPhone in 2007, three types of aftermarket services have been established as 
part of the mobile platform ecosystem: Apple-proprietary, Apple-authorized, and unauthorized services. 
In addition to Apple-organized repair services, third-party spare parts and repair service providers have 
organized an unauthorized aftermarket support to end users directly. Third-party spare parts providers 
specialize on certain components, such as LCD screens, and distribute them via online marketplaces (e.g., 
Alibaba) or specialized importers to third-party repair service providers or end users directly.  
Data Collection 
We started collecting empirical data from primary and secondary sources in late 2018. Our goal was to 
establish a rich picture of the history and specificities of the repair aftermarket in Apple’s mobile platform 
ecosystem. Our sampling strategy focused on organizations that operate as third-party spare parts or 
repair service providers in Apple’s iPhone repair aftermarket. We defined two sampling criteria: (1) the 
organization’s central business model operates at the hardware layer of Apple’s iPhone mobile platform 
ecosystem and (2) the organization is still operative. To date, we have selected three case organizations. 
Table 1 provides details and summarizes our primary data collection completed to date (interviews and 
observations). 
We also collected secondary data from tech bloggers and vloggers (Davidson and Vaast 2009). We 
identified more than 190 relevant blog entries from the blog aggregator Techmeme (Vaast et al. 2013) by 
querying their curated database with the search string ‘(“Apple” OR “iphone”) AND “repair”.’ Snowballing 
references and blog authors, we further collated more than 25 vlog entries from YouTube. Where possible, 
we drilled down to the origin of the blog and vlog entries to verify their credibility and evaluated their 
temporal occurrence. The material includes press releases and public policies announced by the 
ecosystem’s actors, legal documents published by the US Federal Trade Commission, and leaked files. 
Table 1. Sample Demographics and Summary of Data Sources at the Time of Writing 
Organization Parts&Repair-1 
A German emergent venture that 
publishes self-recorded repair 
manuals in form of how-to-videos, 
matches end users with a deficient 
device to repair professionals, and 
resells non-branded spare parts 
from China to repair professionals 
and end users. 
Parts&Repair-2 
A Dutch e-commerce 
platform providing high-
quality spare parts for a 
variety of smartphone 
models of different OEMs 
at competitive market 
prices. 
Parts&Repair-3 
A US repair platform specializing 
in curating community-created 
repair manuals, creating new 
repair knowledge by 
disassembling recently released 
smartphone models, and 
reselling imported unbranded 
spare parts. 
Year founded 2014 2003 2003 
Primary data 
sources 
Interviews: 
• CEO (2x) 
• CTO 
• Project Manager Sales 
• Head of Online Marketing 
• Head of Operations 
• Head of Purchase 
 
Observations: 
• 3 onsite visits 
• 1 workshop 
Interviews: 
• Head of Marketing & 
Business Development 
• Product Category 
Manager 
• Repair Professional 
 
Observations: 
• 2 onsite visits 
• none at the time of writing 
Secondary 
data sources 
• Aggregator blog (Techmeme) and tech blogs (Vice Motherboard, MacRumors, Wired) 
• YouTube videos from online repair community (REWA Technology, JC Programmer) 
• Press releases (Apple Inc., The Repair Association, Federal Trade Commission) 
• Public policies (Apple Inc., US Copyright Office) 
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Data Analysis 
Three different perspectives on platforms (Reuver et al. 2018; Sørensen et al. 2015) presently inform our 
coding process: Mobile platform ecosystems research (Basole and Karla 2011; Jacobides et al. 2018; Qiu 
et al. 2017) provides us with concepts to identify and relate actors involved in Apple’s iPhone repair 
aftermarket; research on platform dynamics (Foerderer et al. 2019; Tiwana et al. 2010) offers us a set of 
concepts to describe the platform’s structural development over time; and research on platform 
governance (Eaton et al. 2015; Ghazawneh and Henfridsson 2013; Wareham et al. 2014) provide concepts 
to explain how platform owners balance the platform-specific equilibrium of stability and evolvability. 
We embedded these seed concepts into the typical process of open, axial, and selective coding. Because 
both data collection and analysis remain ongoing, we omit most details here. So far, we have been 
performing our data analysis in two iterative steps: First, we analyze primary data prior to examining 
secondary data, to minimize bias. Second, we probe the secondary data to corroborate the interview 
statements, performing follow-up interviews in case of noted contradictions, inconsistencies, or 
incomplete information.  
Preliminary Findings 
To understand how hardware-layer dynamics are shaped through the interactions between platform 
owner and third-party repair actors, we took two steps. 
First, from the data we inductively developed theoretical concepts to describe hardware-layer (1) 
changes, (2) governance acts, and (3) governance responses in mobile platform ecosystems. Table 2 
summarizes and illustrates the main concepts of this conceptualization. 
Table 2. Key Concepts of Hardware-layer Changes, Governance Acts, and Governance Responses 
Concept Definition Empirical Illustration 
(1) Hardware-layer changes: Repair changes to physical components of mobile devices that are enabled or 
performed by repair actors to recover the components’ original technological functionality. 
Physical 
component 
A physical object in a mobile device, which 
bears technological functionality. 
A camera sensor component provides visual sensing 
functionality to the motherboard. 
Repair actor A social actor of varying relationship to the 
platform owner that enables (e.g., spare parts 
provider) or performs (e.g., repair service 
provider) repair changes on physical 
components of a mobile device. 
• Proprietary: Apple Store 
• Authorized: Apple Authorized Service Provider 
(e.g., Best Buy) 
• Unauthorized: Independent repair shop or spare 
parts provider (e.g., iFixit) 
Repair 
change  
An act of modification to a physical component 
in the architecture of a mobile phone: 
(a) Restoring: returning a broken physical 
component to its original state 
(b) Replacing: exchanging a broken with a new 
physical component 
• Restoring: Recovering the charging functionality 
by restoring a detached flex cable between charging 
connector and battery. 
• Replacing:  Recovering the touch functionality by 
replacing a broken touch sensor component with a 
new one. 
(2) Hardware-layer governance acts: Physical, digital, and legal acts performed by the platform owner with 
the purpose to control hardware-layer changes. 
Physical act An act of control that changes the physical 
modifiability of the hardware layer. 
Apple introduces a special screw that can only be 
operated with a special screwdriver unavailable to 
unauthorized repair actors (see first vignette). 
Digital act An act of control that changes the technological 
dependencies between the hardware and the 
software layer. 
Apple releases iOS 8 disabling unauthorized 
aftermarket home buttons (see second vignette). 
Legal act An act of control that changes the legal 
conditions for repair actors or end users. 
Apple declares to void the consumer warranty of their 
mobile devices in any case of unauthorized repair. 
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Second, we developed a narrative account (Pentland 1999) of hardware-layer dynamics that are shaped 
through repair changes, platform governance acts, and corresponding responses over time. To date, we 
have focused our data analysis on dynamics emerging from physical and digital governance acts (see Table 
2). Figure 1 provides a visual summary of key events since the release of the first iPhone in June 2007. For 
reasons of brevity, in this paper we only provide two representative vignettes of hardware-layer dynamics. 
The first vignette concerns Apple performing a physical governance act to control the modifiability of its 
ecosystem’s hardware layer when it introduced the iPhone 4 with a special—so-called ‘Pentalobular’—screw 
that could not be operated with typical available screwdrivers (see Figure 1). The founder of iFixit, a leading 
online repair community and provider of repair spare parts, released a blog post, shortly after, stating: 
“This screw head is new to us. In fact, there isn’t a single reputable supplier that sells exactly the 
same screwdrivers Apple’s technicians use—which is Apple’s point. They picked an obscure head 
that no one would have.” (Founder, iFixit Blog, 2011) 
These screws hampered independent repair of iPhones 4 (i.e., hardware-layer changes) as repair actors 
were not able to open the device without damaging its screws. However, since Apple first released devices 
with these screws to the Japanese market in mid-2010, iFixit was aware of this issue ahead of time and 
had actively sourced appropriate screwdrivers when the special screws hit the US market in January 2011: 
“Fortunately, our always-creative hardware acquisition team has been on this problem for a 
while. It’s our responsibility to provide [independent repair service providers] with all the tools 
[they] need to work on electronics, and we have a solution […]! […] We have found a driver that 
works for the 5-point “Pentalobe” fasteners on the iPhone 4 case.”  (Founder, iFixit Blog, 2011) 
While the issue of impaired modifiability seemed to be settled for a while, Apple introduced another special 
screw (the so-called ‘Tri-point’ screw) with the iPhone 7 in September 2016. Again, the suppliers responded 
quickly with a corresponding screwdriver. For many tool resellers, however, the hassle remains to date: 
(3) Hardware-layer governance responses: Physical, digital, and legal acts performed by repair actors in 
response to hardware-layer governance acts. 
Physical 
response 
A reactive act with the purpose to lift 
restrictions on the physical modifiability. 
iFixit introduces a special screwdriver that can 
operate the special screw introduced by Apple. 
Digital 
response 
A reactive act with the purpose to bypass 
restrictions on the technological dependencies 
between the hardware and the software layer. 
JC Programmer introduces a chip re-programmer 
device enabling repair actors to edit integrated chips 
that cause the disabling of physical components. 
Legal 
response 
A reactive act with the purpose to amend legal 
restrictions for repair actors or end users. 
Repair.org creates media coverage and jurisdictional 
awareness forcing Apple to revise its policy of voiding 
warranties in any case of unauthorized repair. 
 
Figure 1. Selected Governance Acts and Responses in Apple’s iPhone Repair Aftermarket 
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“Apple has two screw types that no other [mobile phone] manufacturer uses. For one of them [i.e., 
the ‘Pentalobular’ screw], the screwdriver is available, but expensive. For the other one [i.e., the 
‘Tri-point’ screw], we have a screwdriver, which does not fit perfectly and damages the screws.” 
 (Head of Purchase, P&R-1, 2019) 
Our second vignette describes Apple’s repeated exercise of digital governance acts to control the 
dependencies between software and hardware layer, when rolling out updates of its iOS (i.e., software 
layer) that rendered non-genuine spare parts (i.e., hardware layer) incompatible with the device: 
 “Apple has some iOS updates that disable, for example, the [aftermarket] home buttons and some 
functions of these home buttons.” (Head of Purchase, P&R-1, 2019) 
These ‘software lock-downs’ of aftermarket components first occurred with the introduction of the Touch 
ID sensor in the home button of the iPhone 5s, whose aftermarket counterparts were locked by iOS 8 
released in September 2014 (see Figure 1). As a result of this lock-down, affected end users experienced 
the so-called ‘Error 53’, which left them with disabled—‘bricked’—iPhones. While the independent repair 
community became aware of this error—and that it was somehow related to third-party home button or 
screen repairs—by the end of 2014, an explanation for ‘Error 53’ remained hidden for a long time. 
Eventually, reliable news spread clarifying that: 
“[…] repairs made by third-party services using components not sourced from the original device 
cause the iPhone to fail a Touch ID validation check because the mismatched parts are unable to 
properly sync.” (Juli Clover, MacRumors Blog, 2016) 
Various workarounds for repair practices on hardware layer then emerged, including technically 
demanding circuit board-level micro-soldering. However, a viable cure to successfully replace a broken 
iPhone 6 home button was not found. As the iOS 9 update in September 2015 did not bring the desired ‘un-
bricking’ resolution, negative media coverage about increasing numbers of disabled iPhones and class action 
lawsuits forced Apple to publicly defend its governance. They released a patch to iOS 9.2.1 shortly after. The 
patch unbricked the phones, yet left the aftermarket home button’s Touch ID functionality disabled: 
“We protect fingerprint data using a secure enclave, which is uniquely paired to the Touch ID 
sensor. When an iPhone is serviced […] for changes that affect the Touch ID sensor, the pairing is 
re-validated. This check ensures the device and the iOS features related to Touch ID remain 
secure. […] When iOS detects that the pairing fails, Touch ID […] is disabled […]. When an iPhone 
is serviced by an unauthorized repair provider, […] invalid components that affect the Touch ID 
sensor could cause the check to fail if the pairing cannot be validated.” (Apple, Press Release, 2016) 
Essentially, Apple actively managed the iPhone’s repair aftermarket in this case: while proprietary and 
authorized repair actors were technically enabled to re-validate replaced home button components, 
unauthorized repair actors could not and were, therefore, left uncompetitive. It is important to note the 
complex interplay between physical components and the software functionalities they bear: 
 “It’s multiple [issues]: One is that the Touch ID [functionality] does not work anymore and the 
other [one] is that the home button [component] is completely not registered by the device.” 
 (Head of Purchase, P&R-1, 2019) 
Since the iPhone 5s model, a home button component carries both functionalities, Touch ID and return-
to-home. In the ‘Error 53’ incidence, Apple has performed two levels of digital governance acts in 
response to hardware-layer changes (i.e., replaced home buttons): Initially, they disabled the entire phone 
via a software update; eventually, they only disabled the security-relevant Touch ID functionality. This 
gave third-party repair actors the freedom to recover at least the return-to-home functionality with an 
aftermarket home button component without disabling the entire phone. Yet, Apple locked both 
functionalities (i.e., Touch ID and return-to-home) again with the release of iOS 10 in September 2016. 
This act caused so much of an uproar in the repair community that a Chinese spare parts service provider 
decided to build its own home button component that enabled third-party repair actors to bypass Apple’s 
new digital governance act: 
There is a workaround […]: We now buy a universal home button. That’s for four different models 
[…] connecting via Bluetooth. And the Bluetooth enables the functions that were disabled by 
Apple.” (Head of Purchase, P&R-1, 2019) 
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Expected Contributions, Limitations, and Research Outlook 
With our ongoing inductive case research, our aim is to expand the literature on mobile platform 
ecosystems by bringing hardware-layer dynamics into the conversation. With the case data explained in 
this paper, we are currently probing the development of a process theory that explains these dynamics 
and how they are shaped through change, governance, and response acts made by platform owners and 
complementors. We are further exploring the possibilities to expand our research towards a comparative 
case study, to contrast our emergent findings from a highly controlled mobile platform ecosystem (i.e., 
Apple’s iOS-based) to a more loosely controlled mobile platform ecosystem (e.g., Google’s Android-
based). While Apple tightly integrates and controls software and hardware layers, Google allows its 
software layer to be married to various hardware layers (e.g., Samsung, Xiaomi). A different motivation 
might lead to different governance acts. 
We expect our findings to be of primary interest to two IS research streams. First, our extended view on 
the architecture of mobile platforms sheds light on so far neglected hardware-layer dynamics adding to 
the IS literature on platform research. Our research raises new questions on the relationship between 
hardware and software layers, e.g., how and when do hardware-layer dynamics occur? How do hardware-
layer dynamics influence software-layer dynamics and vice versa? What is the role of middleware in 
platform governance? Second, the concepts we develop from our study of mobile platform ecosystems 
may also inform other platform ecosystems research where hardware components are present. 
Nowadays, digital product platforms with software and hardware layers are ubiquitously available, 
ranging from smart home devices (e.g., Amazon’s Alexa) to smart production machines (e.g., Industry 
4.0). The ecosystems surrounding these digital products differ and understanding how these differences 
generate diverse hardware-layer dynamics should be central to future research. 
For practitioners, our research stresses that hardware-layer dynamics of supposedly software-driven 
platform ecosystems should not be disregarded. Representing a business opportunity to one (e.g., 
unauthorized repair service providers) and a threat to the other stakeholder (i.e., platform owner), this 
issue is an ostensibly clear affair. Acknowledging the regulatory and competitive movements, however, 
platform owners should reconsider their position. Even alternatives, such as converting unauthorized 
third-party actors into authorized ones by officially embedding them into the mobile platform ecosystem 
via sensitively designed hardware-layer governance acts, might be worthwhile to explore. 
Several limitations provide boundaries to our research. First, our selected case setting is exclusive to 
Apple’s mobile platform ecosystem limiting the generalizability of our findings. As noted above, we are 
currently attempting to obtain access to a comparative case setting. Second, while we try buffering 
potential biases in our tech blog data (Eaton et al. 2015) by triangulating it with interview data from third-
party actors, perspectives from the platform owner or authorized service providers are not sufficiently 
represented in our sample. We will deal with this limitation by actively sampling authorized repair service 
providers. Third, we chose established concepts from platform governance research as our main 
theoretical point of departure. We noted already how not all explanatory mechanisms tightly fit our 
setting. For example, because Apple is not actively trying to attract independent third-party repair 
complementors it also does not provide relevant boundary resources (Eaton et al. 2015). Finally, other 
ways of framing our data analysis also exist, e.g., by focusing on modularity (Cabigiosu et al. 2013). We 
plan to deal with this limitation by constantly probing different theoretical lenses examining their fit to 
our data. 
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